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Public management networks are fixtures of contemporary governance. They play an  important 
role in planning for and delivering public goods and services. However, public management 
networks do not always possess the capacity to convert collective solutions to formal policy or 
program adjustments. Despite the very broad range of activities in them, the ability of networks 
to create this “policy energy” is limited. Government or other powerful agencies can often domi-
nate the management of networks, elected officials may make policy decisions that are incon-
sistent with the recommended action of networks, and assessing the performance of networks 
is very often a moving target. This article discusses these and other types of administrative and 
political barriers that can hinder the ability of public management networks to influence policy 
making and implementation.
Keywords: Public management networks, network limitations.
1. Introduction
The scope of attention given to managing networks has increased over the past few 
decades. As more practitioners work across organizational boundaries (Kettl, 2006), more 
scholars have focused their attention to networks by developing frameworks for manag-
ing network processes (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006;  Emerson, 
Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012; McGuire, 2002; Purdy, 2012; Rethemeyer & Hatmaker, 2008). 
The underlying assumption of these frameworks is that management enables multiple orga-
nizational representatives to create multi-agency solutions to public problems and to achieve 
the collective goal(s) of the network. Policy design and implementation are portrayed 
merely as direct products of effective network administration. While such atmospheres do 
prevail sometimes, the opposite also exists in network operations: “acrimony, power deter-
mination, disagreement over problems and aims, impossibility in reaching agreement, and 
lack of implementation ability” (McGuire & Agranoff, 2011, p. 266). These obstacles are 
rarely discussed in the network and collaboration literatures (Vangen & Huxham, 2014).
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The types of networks portrayed in these and other frameworks are what we refer to 
as “public management networks,” which include agencies involved in public policy mak-
ing and administrative structures through which public goods and services are planned, 
designed, produced, and delivered (and any or all of the activities). Such networks are 
typically intersectoral, intergovernmental, and based functionally in a specific policy or 
policy area. That is, officials from government organizations and agencies at federal, state, 
and local levels operate in structures of exchange and production with representatives 
from profit-making and not-for-profit organizations.
We differentiate between public management networks and social networks. The 
former are goal-directed, whereas the latter are serendipitous networks comprised of indi-
viduals who happen to connect. Social networks are not managed in the sense that direc-
tion is applied to structuring and guiding the relationships. Social networks do include 
specific, but sometimes unintentional, patterns of connectivity (Cross & Parker, 2004). 
These social networks in the workplace, for example, can be important mechanisms for 
improving managerial decisions and they are not devoid of goals, but they “do not need to 
be governed as a whole, since they do not aim to achieve a preconceived shared objective” 
(Saz-Carranza, 2012, p. 7). The public management networks discussed here are governed 
to some degree by network members.
While recent studies elucidate the types of managerial skills that are (or can be) uti-
lized in network settings, there has not been enough focus on the problem of whether all 
public management networks are strong enough to make a substantive difference in deter-
mining the design and outcomes of public policy. Take, for example, the U.S. National Rural 
Development Partnership (NRDP) that was created in 1990. NRDP was a collaborative 
effort involving representatives from all three levels of governments, tribal governments, 
the private sector, and the nonprofit sector to promote rural development across the nation. 
The primary vehicles through which the partnership sought to achieve its goals were State 
Rural Development Councils (SRDCs). These state-level councils, still in existence today 
in a handful of states, are designed to advance rural interests through collaboration, part-
nerships, and helping rural communities to access resources they need to accomplish their 
community-level goals, and are responsible for creating their own mission, structure, and 
operating guidelines, and implementing action plans. The ability of these public manage-
ment networks to affect change on a regional or national level, however, was constrained 
by governor’s offices, state economic development agencies, state legislatures, and the 
state-based offices of the largest funder, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (Radin et al., 
1996). Federal funding for the SRDCs was eliminated within the last decade for most of 
the 40 councils and those that remain are funded largely through foundation grants. While 
heralded in the 1990s as one response to the problems of rural communities, these substan-
tive policy barriers were not easily overcome by street-level, network action. The network 
system of tribes, community providers, industry associations, and state and local imple-
menters could not turn around this reluctance to continue the program. There are other 
examples of the limitations of public management networks in Spain (Blanco & Goma, 
2002), the United Kingdom (Newman, 2005; Rhodes, 1997), cities in the Midwestern 
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United States (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003), and Scotland (Huxham & Vangen, 2005), but 
these studies are often outnumbered by the rosier frameworks dotting the public manage-
ment research landscape.
Our central argument is that network deliberations and the solutions networks pro-
pose for implementing policies often fail to replace government decisions, even when 
implementation is shared with government agencies. As a blocking force, agency (non-
network) power is very real when lead organizations, often government agencies, serve 
to keep certain problems off the agenda, withhold support for key network strategies or 
decisions, or withhold required agency-controlled resources (McGuire & Agranoff, 2011). 
In these situations, public management networks may have low capacity for policy (for-
mulation and/or implementation) influence or policy change, which constitutes low levels 
of what we call policy “energy.” Policy energy refers to the capacity of any organization, 
agency, or other structural arrangement (in this case, public management networks) to 
affect the design and outcomes of a public policy or program. Too often, networks devise 
reasonable solutions, but then run into administrative and political barriers that prevent the 
next action steps. And public management networks rarely have the legitimate authority to 
enforce compliance with their own preferred solutions. As O’Toole (1997) argues, admin-
istrators working within networks “should not assume that they possess authority” (p. 48). 
When managing networks, goals can be shared, objectives can be achieved, and solutions 
can be offered, but the government agency’s representative(s), even if s/he is a member 
of the network, usually makes the final policy decision. Lacking policy energy, public 
management networks will recommend action more than they decide policy. This article 
focuses on the administrative and political barriers that public management networks face 
in trying to generate policy energy.
2. Administrative Barriers to Generating Policy Energy
Much has been learned by scholars who have investigated the activities of public 
management networks. The “black box” of the workings of such networks is becoming 
clearer, or at least less muddled. For example, research indicates that governing authority 
in public management networks is not always conferred or assigned to a single govern-
ment or non-governmental agency (Weber & Khademian, 2008). More than one manager 
or leader may exist in a single network, and that managerial or leadership role may not be 
defined as clearly as that of a supervisor in hierarchical organizations. Also, scholars ac-
knowledge that public management networks are governed largely by network members’ 
ability to facilitate collaboration through relational skills such as patience, empathy, hon-
esty, and deference (Vangen & Huxham, 2003). Administrative tasks such as motivating 
network members, creating trust, treating others as equals, maintaining a close knit group, 
sharing information freely amongst networks members, and other people-oriented behav-
iors are important to ensure network effectiveness (Silvia & McGuire, 2010). Research 
also suggests that the typical network member (or manager) operates in multiple networks. 
Although a “home” network may be the primary responsibility of a manager(s), other 
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public management networks intersect or are adjacent to the home network, resulting in 
a system of networks that can lead to overlapping responsibilities and roles for network 
members (Rethemeyer & Hatmaker, 2008).
The black box of networks also contains the ingredients for administrative obstacles 
to generating policy energy. One such obstacle can be found in the different, sometimes 
conflicting methods for a manager to facilitate network activity. Milward and Provan 
(2006) build a framework based on the idea that there may be a designated, legitimate 
steerer of the network, but there may also be managers in the network, who can have split 
missions and sometimes split loyalties. This distinction between steerers and managers 
is consistent with the ideas proposed by those who differentiate between governance of 
a network (exercising control, regulation, inducement, incentive or persuasive influence 
over the whole network), and management within a network (activities carried out by indi-
viduals who are themselves actors in the network) (6, Goodwin, Peck, & Freeman, 2006). 
The role of a manager “is not given a priori to one actor” (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, 
p. 11). Network management can be undertaken by several actors, with managerial activi-
ties sometimes conducted simultaneously by more than one actor. Since network members 
represent the values and preferences of their home agencies as well as those of the network, 
the members can be placed in a conundrum: Managers may have to choose between serv-
ing their individual agencies’ missions and the mission of the network (Thomson & Perry, 
2006). Additionally, few government agency administrators work full-time in networks. 
With the exception of certain “boundary spanners” who work full time to fulfill cross-
agency tasks (LeRoux, 2014), many administrators spend as little as 15 to 20 percent of 
their total time in collaborative activities, including participating in networks (Agranoff & 
McGuire, 2003). There actually is little time for a public management network to develop 
policy energy due to the other overwhelming demands on network members.
There are situations in which the different managers in the network enact their roles 
differently. One network member might approach the role as a facilitator who is willing 
and able to move the collaborative agenda forward by allowing all members to have a voice 
and seeking consensus. Others may depend on “collaborative thuggery,” which is perhaps 
a more pragmatic but less relational approach to managing networks that generally is not 
consistent with the spirit of collaboration (Vangen & Huxham, 2003). Reconciling these 
dual roles is not easy, and leads to public management networks trying to ameliorate con-
flicting agendas rather than advancing the effective design and implementation of policy. 
Policy energy is thus sapped by managerial conflict.
The process of addressing such internal conflict results in little time for exerting ef-
fort into managing external stakeholders. These external stakeholders, whose support is 
needed to formulate and implement policy (Silvia, 2011), and therefore generate policy 
energy, include the recipients of the services provided by the network, the home agency 
that the members of the network represent, as well as those home agencies’ stakeholders. 
Perhaps most important, the stakeholders who are rarely touched by managerial activity 
are elected officials and top agency leaders. Internal relationships can trump the main-
tenance of external relationships, making it difficult to cope with the power of external 
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forces such as key agencies, critical policymakers, and other important “movers” in the 
policy world (McGuire & Agranoff, 2011).
While in the midst of moving the collaboration agenda forward, there are processing 
costs that can overwhelm public management networks. Network participants are con-
cerned about the time and opportunity costs taken away from the management of their 
home organization (Agranoff, 2007). Graddy and Chen (2006) point to the transaction 
costs involved in network-based decision making. Many hours are spent in task forces or 
work groups that occur outside of the more formal partner meetings, resulting in a type 
of “collaborative inertia” that is marked by sluggish progress, lack of achievements, and 
sometimes network collapse (Huxham & Vangen, 2005). Even when this inertia is some-
how overcome, it nevertheless comes at the expense of prolonged consensus building and 
relationship management. Such relationship management is often in a state of flux, requir-
ing the “constant interplay between process design and process management’ (Edelenbos & 
Klijn, 2006, p. 426), and resulting in hyperactivity and inefficient overprocessing.
3. Political Barriers to Generating Policy Energy
How do political barriers and power imbalances prevent public management net-
works from influencing the design and outcomes of public policy? It has become a truism 
in research that power and influence may be unequally distributed in networks (McGuire, 
2011). The more power possessed by an organization (or the organization’s representa-
tive), the more influence it has to determine the nature of the interorganizational exchange 
(Cook, 1977). A scholarly focus on management based in consensus building and relation-
ship management masks the potential for coercive behavior in networks. The more power-
ful members of the network can shape network activities through such means as controlling 
the agenda and even withholding needed policy making resources (e.g. finances, human 
capital, political support, information, expertise). Powerful members can resist collabora-
tion because of their concerns for protecting their agencies’ “turf,” whereby they defend 
against other network members encroaching on their autonomy.
Power imbalances also can exist in networks because some organizations or even 
a single organization bring to the network an inordinate amount of resources; thus the 
organization’s representative is able to exert undue influence over the other network 
members. Such power asymmetries suggest “the inevitability that some partners will be 
more central to the enactment of the collaborative agenda than are others . . .” (Vangen & 
Huxham, 2014, p. 58). These network partners may be in opportunistic positions (Burt, 
2009) that create unequal opportunity among network members, while others may be 
less willing or able members of a network. It is also true that in addition to experienc-
ing power asymmetries, power can be and often is redistributed within the network over 
time. Gray (1989) acknowledges that at least a temporary redistribution of power occurs 
regularly in collaborative settings. In these situations, the design of public policy can be 
dominated either by a single network member or by members whose policy influence 
waxes and wanes.
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Powerful governmental actors shape and determine public policy outcomes through 
the instrumental use of networks (Klijn & Skelcher, 2007). One example of this can be 
found in the increasing use—or misuse—of performance measures, which are often de-
termined by political considerations (Radin, 2006). As Koliba (2014) argues regarding 
networks, “[q]uestions of performance are eminently informed by who has power” (p. 88). 
Various stakeholders involved in the network evaluate its effectiveness using multiple and 
sometimes conflicting criteria, and different constituencies expect different outcomes. 
These constituents are principals “who monitor and fund the network; agents, who work 
in the networks both as administrators and service-level professionals; and clients, who 
actually receive the services provided by the network” (Provan & Milward, 2001, p. 416). 
The relationships between principals, agents, and clients, result in differing assessments 
of effectiveness by the community, the network itself, and the organizations that are part 
of the network.
In addition to the potentially conflicting assessments of performance by various 
stakeholders, network objectives vary over time, thus making it difficult to establish a con-
sistent and clear policy goal. Public management networks themselves can be so complex 
that their impact on performance is somewhat unpredictable for all involved (O’Toole, 
1997), so evaluating a network’s performance based on ex ante objectives is often unre-
alistic (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). Public management networks have no central, coordi-
nating actor to design and monitor goals, therefore measures based in goal achievement 
are less applicable. Because of the various stakeholders involved, it is a challenge just to 
determine whose objectives or perspectives should be prioritized when trying to evalu-
ate network performance. If certain parties do not participate in the interaction process, 
the chances are high that their interests and preferences will not be represented in any 
network-derived solution. Even when a representative of an agency is supportive of a 
network solution, it does not mean that the entire agency and its sponsors/funders will be 
supportive. The ability of public management networks to create policy energy is limited 
when a policy outcome is a continuously moving target.
Networks have not eclipsed the centrality of government agencies in designing and 
implementing public policy, which is another reason why networks are limited in generat-
ing policy energy. Even in public management networks comprised of representatives from 
many different organizations and across sectors, it is the network member(s) from gov-
ernment agencies who often pull the various governmental and non-governmental forces 
together and distribute power and responsibilities; it is also the focus of political identity 
and the main instrument of political legitimacy (Hirst, 2000). A public organization is cre-
ated by law to serve a particular purpose, whereas many public management networks are 
cooperative ventures whose members must continually work to convince their stakehold-
ers that their work in the larger network is valuable and worthwhile (Milward & Provan, 
2006). There still are legal mandates and financial resources that government agencies 
control, and the legitimacy that government participation brings to the network is some-
times necessary to garner and maintain the support of both network members and external 
stakeholders. For these reasons, the predominant nature of the government agency can 
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virtually overlay or even overshadow the operations of networks, which is perhaps the 
ultimate political barrier to creating policy energy (McGuire & Agranoff, 2010).
4. Conclusion
We have argued that some public management networks lack substantial levels of 
policy energy. Government agencies are changing to accommodate collaborative, net-
worked activity as their representatives increasingly work with organizations external to 
the agency, but networks still face administrative and political obstacles that constrain their 
capacity to make policy changes and program adjustments. A government manager may 
be convinced that s/he knows best and seek to control network processes and performance, 
which results in the network as a whole possessing only minimal influence on the policy 
process. The transaction costs of managing public management networks can be high and 
sometimes insurmountable due to the multiple and conflicting agendas with which each 
network member must contend. Performance measures for networked programs can be 
“gamed” and external political considerations of the effectiveness of networks can trump 
the demands of managing the internal processes of networks. These obstacles are not easy 
to overcome.
We do not wish to overstate the argument. Public management networks are far from 
powerless and they certainly can, and do, influence the design and outcomes of public pol-
icy. The increase of research on public management networks confirms their prevalence 
and relevance to public management in general. Rarely, however, is there an acknowledge-
ment by researchers that there are limitations to public management networks, particularly 
in their capacity for generating policy energy. Scholars should turn their attention to un-
derstanding this important phenomenon.
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